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UNDERSTANDING THE DEBATE OVER 
NECESSITY: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND 
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF ANNULMENTS IN 
THE ARGENTINE GAS CASES 
ELIZABETH A. MARTINEZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several years, foreign investors have filed 49 claims 
with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) against Argentina.1 Many of these claims originated from certain 
restrictive measures undertaken by the Argentine government in response 
to the nation’s economic and financial crisis from 1999 to 2001.2 Though 
Argentina claimed the emergency measures were necessary for the 
maintenance of public order, such measures “resulted in the greatest wave 
of claims by foreign investors against a single host country in recent 
history.”3 
Of those claims against Argentina that have been adjudicated, three 
tribunals awarded damages in excess of $100 million to the investor-
claimants, which are among the largest awards granted by an ICSID 
tribunal.4 Perhaps even more noteworthy than the amount of damages 
 
        *     Duke University School of Law, JD/LLM expected 2013. I am grateful to Julie A. Maupin, for 
helping me to appreciate the intricacies of legal developments in international investment law, and for 
her valuable insight and support during the preparation of this article. I am also thankful for comments 
provided by A. Edelen, T. Kopcial, D. Marvin, E. Okojie, M. Siller and members of the DJCIL editorial 
staff on earlier drafts.  
 1.  The website for the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [hereinafter 
ICSID] lists both pending and concluded cases filed with ICSID, which are searchable by the official 
name of the respondent state (here, the Argentine Republic). See List of ICSID Cases, INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases (last 
updated Mar. 15, 2010). 
 2.  See Karl P. Sauvant, The Rise of International Investment, Investment Agreements and 
Investment Disputes, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 13, 13 (Karl 
P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson eds., 2008) (noting that as of the end of 2006, 42 of 45 
claims against Argentina were related to the Argentine financial crisis). 
 3.  José E. Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse 
into the Heart of the Investment Regime, 2008/2009 Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 379, 379 (2009). 
 4.  Id., at 380;. see also Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 58, 60 (2007). Franck finds that, out of 52 publicly available 
investor-state dispute cases that decided damages, one of four tribunals awarded over $10 million in a 
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awarded are the conflicting interpretations of the necessity of Argentina’s 
emergency measures as a response to the economic crisis.5 In many of the 
claims against it, Argentina consistently raised the defense that it should be 
excused from liability for damages to foreign investments because of the 
“state of necessity” during its economic crisis,6 otherwise known as a 
necessity defense. Argentina has argued for a necessity defense in claims 
brought by investors in many different industries, including infrastructure, 
manufacturing, and natural resources.7 However, commentators and 
practitioners have taken a particular interest in a group of ICSID cases 
collectively known as the Argentine Gas Cases.8 Each of the four claims 
 
claim against Argentina. Id. at 60, n.270 (noting specifically CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005), 44 ILM 1205 (2005), which awarded 
investors U.S. $133,200,000). Additionally, Franck notes that three other awards, on the higher end of 
the spectrum but not subject to coding for purposes of her research, averaged U.S. $150,000,000. Two 
of these three awards were against Argentina. Id. at 62, n.276 (noting specifically Siemens A.G. v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award (Feb. 6, 2007), 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemens-Argentina-Award.pdf, which awarded investors U.S. 
$217,838,439, and Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/30, Award (July 14, 2006), 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf, which awarded investors U.S. 
$165,240,753). Each of the cases referenced by Franck can be found in the List of ICSID Cases on the 
ICSID website, supra note 1. 
 5.  Jorge E. Viñuales, State of Necessity and Peremptory Norms in International Investment Law, 
14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 79, 81 (2008). 
 6. Sauvant, supra note 2, at 14. Argentina’s defense is otherwise known as a “necessity defense,” 
and such term will be used to describe Argentina’s defense claim throughout this paper. 
 7. Id. at 13-14. 
 8. Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 379. The Argentine Gas Cases consist of the following 
four claims against Argentina: 
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award 
(May 12, 2005), 44 ILM 1205 (2005) [hereinafter CMS award]; LG&E Energy Corp. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006) 21 
ICSID Rev.-FILJ 269 (2006) [hereinafter LG&E decision on liability];  
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award 
(May 22, 2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf [hereinafter Enron 
award];  
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 
2007), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases 
[hereinafter Sempra award]. 
For the purposes of analyzing Argentina’s necessity defense, the scope of this paper is limited to the 
Argentine Gas Cases listed in this footnote. Although the necessity defense has been raised across 
different industry sectors, restricting comparative analysis to a single sector (here, natural gas), avoids 
variances in the application of the necessity defense to different industries. Assuming the successful 
invocation of the necessity defense grants a state broad discretion to enact measures to combat the state 
of necessity, the type of measures enacted to combat a military crisis may have drastically different 
effects than the type of measures enacted to combat an economic crisis. For example, in a military 
crisis, measures enacted may implicate aspects of society that affect human rights, such as availability 
of food and water services. However, measures enacted in an economic crisis, such as nationalization of 
foreign investments in gas distribution companies, for example, may not have similar effects related to 
human-rights concerns. 
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was brought by a foreign corporation investing in Argentina’s gas 
transportation and distribution industry; yet, each of the four tribunals 
issued a significantly divergent interpretation of the necessity defense 
claimed by Argentina.9 While three of the four tribunals’ awards share 
certain commonalities, ultimately finding Argentina liable for treaty 
violations despite its necessity defense, the fourth tribunal found in favor of 
Argentina.10 Attempts at reconciling the different interpretations and 
conclusions of the awards regarding Argentina’s necessity defense leave 
many questions unanswered. Further complicating matters, two of the three 
awards levied against Argentina were recently annulled with respect to 
Argentina’s necessity defense.11 
Awards by tribunals administered under ICSID may be annulled only 
in limited situations;12 namely, where a tribunal is improperly constituted, 
fails to justify its decision, or displays “manifest excess of powers,” 
corruption, or “serious departure from a fundamental rule or procedure.”13 
 
 9.  Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 380-81. For a detailed description of the analysis 
conducted by each tribunal, see generally Andrea K. Bjorklund, Emergency Exceptions: State of 
Necessity and Force Majeure, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 459, 474-
98 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008). 
 10. The tribunals in the CMS award, Enron award, and Sempra award found against Argentina on 
the issue of necessity. See Sempra award, supra note 8,  ¶ 355; Enron award, supra note 8,  ¶ 313; CMS 
award, supra note 8,  ¶ 331. The LG&E decision on liability found in favor of Argentina on the issue of 
necessity. See LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶¶ 239-40, 258-59. For a discussion of the 
analysis of the awards, see infra Part II.A. 
 11. Both the Sempra award and the Enron award were annulled with respect to Argentina’s claim 
of necessity. See Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on 
the Argentine Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award, ¶¶ 222-23 (June 29, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0776.pdf [hereinafter Sempra annulment 
decision]; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision 
on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 395 (July 30, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0299.pdf [hereinafter Enron annulment decision]. 
The CMS award was not annulled, despite the annulment committee’s recognition of several “errors of 
law.” See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of 
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶¶ 158-59 (Sept. 
25, 2007), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0187.pdf [hereinafter CMS annulment 
decision]. The LG&E decision on liability is presently undergoing an annulment proceeding, which was 
suspended as of August 1, 2011, pursuant to the parties’ agreement. See List of Pending Cases, supra 
note 1. For a discussion of the analysis of the Annulments, see infra Part II.B. 
 12.  See Christoph Schreuer, Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings, in 
ANNULMENT OF ICSID AWARDS 17, 17 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds., 2004) (“In the 
framework of ICSID Arbitration, annulment was designed as an extraordinary remedy for unusual and 
important cases. It is not a routine step to be taken by a party that has lost a case.”) (emphasis added). 
 13.  INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, art. 52(1)(a)-(e), 
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter the ICSID 
Convention]. As noted by the CMS annulment committee, errors in legal analysis are not grounds for 
annulment. Where the tribunal applied the law, albeit “cryptically and defectively,” it did not 
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With limited grounds for annulment, both the annulment decisions and 
awards in the Argentine Gas Cases differed as to the proper interpretation 
of the necessity defense under both the bilateral investment treaty between 
Argentina and the United States (the U.S.–Argentina BIT)14 and under 
customary international law.15 
The awards and corresponding annulment decisions issued in the 
Argentine Gas Cases have significant implications for the security of 
foreign investments and the legitimacy of international investment law and 
present policy concerns for states party to bilateral investment treaties. 
Prior to addressing these concerns, Part I aims to clarify the contextual 
background for the debate over the necessity defense. It first describes 
Argentina’s political and economic climate and the relevant facts of the 
Argentine Gas Cases. It then discusses the necessity defense as claimed by 
Argentina to excuse its failure to comply with certain provisions of the 
U.S.–Argentina BIT. Part II addresses the different interpretations of the 
necessity defense provided by the tribunals in the Argentine Gas Cases in 
addition to those provided by the respective annulment committees that 
reviewed each case. Having established the context for the debate over the 
necessity defense, Part III discusses concerns about the security of investor 
interests in foreign investment, inconsistencies in the awards and 
subsequent annulments, and related policy issues for states participating in 
the bilateral investment treaty system. Each of these concerns is assessed in 
light of the current debate over the merits of proposed solutions. While the 
proposed solutions present a number of advantages and drawbacks, it is 
clear that without a unified approach to international investment law, 
problems of security, inconsistency, and public policy will continue to 
plague both host states and foreign investors. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Emergency Measures Enacted in Response to Argentina’s Economic 
and Political Crisis 
The Argentine Gas Cases are unique in that “the facts giving rise to 
these disputes were practically identical”16 and that each concerns foreign 
 
demonstrate a “manifest excess of powers.” See CMS annulment decision, supra note 11,  ¶ 136. 
 14.  See generally Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 (1991) [hereinafter the U.S.–Argentina BIT]. 
 15.  See generally Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with Commentaries art. 25, U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. DOC. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter the Draft 
Articles]. 
 16.  Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 388 (citing generally the CMS, LG&E, Enron and 
MARTINEZ.FINAL.V3(DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013 12:41 PM 
2012] UNDERSTANDING THE DEBATE OVER NECESSITY 153 
investments in Argentina’s natural gas industry. In 1992, Argentina enacted 
the Gas Law, privatizing the natural gas transportation and distribution 
industry into ten companies, each of which was granted an operating 
license.17 Foreign investors, including CMS, Enron, Sempra and LG&E,18 
purchased significant interests in the licensed companies.19 Their interest in 
making these acquisitions was integrally related to three key pillars of the 
Argentine government’s privatization process: (i) a stable, investor-friendly 
tariff regime denominated in U.S. dollars (citation?), (ii) the 1991 
Convertibility Law,20 which pegged the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar at 
a one-to-one exchange rate, and (iii) the periodic adjustment of the tariff 
regime based on the U.S. Producer Price Index (U.S. PPI) pursuant to the 
Gas Law.21 In addition, the Argentine government assured investors it 
would neither revise nor revoke the operating licenses.22 
However, the Argentine economy took a turn for the worse beginning 
in the late 1990s. By 2001, the government was unable to repay foreign 
creditors and the country’s banks suffered serious liquidity problems.23 
Argentina’s rigid exchange rate and monetary policy were largely to blame, 
because tight policies were unable to respond to a number of external 
shocks (stagnating commodity prices, increase in cost of capital, 
appreciation of the dollar, and devaluation of the currency of Brazil, 
 
Sempra awards, supra note 8, and the CMS annulment decision, supra note 11). See also Nicholas 
Song, Between Scylla and Charybdis – Can a Plea of Necessity Offer Safe Passage to States in 
Responding to an Economic Crisis Without Incurring Liability to Foreign Investors?, 19 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 235, 237 (2008) (citing Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and the Host 
State’s Power to Handle Economic Crises: Comment on the ICSID Decision in LG&E v. Argentina, 24 
J. INT’L ARB. 265, 267 (2007) and August Reinisch, Necessity in International Investment Arbitration – 
An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E 
v. Argentina, 3 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 4 (2006)); Viñuales, supra note 5, at 80-81. For a concise, 
but thorough description of the general facts that gave rise to the claims by CMS, Enron, Sempra and 
LG&E, see generally Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 388-91; Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 478-79; 
Eric David Kasenetz, Note, Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures: The Aftermath of 
Argentina’s State of Necessity and the Current Fight in the ICSID, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 709, 
712-16 (2009-10). 
 17.  The Gas Law is otherwise known as the Ley del Gas Natural, Law No. 24076, June 9, 1992, 
[27407] B.O. 30, available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/475/norma.htm. 
 18.  CMS, Enron, Sempra, and LG&E are also the investor-claimants in each of the four 
Argentine Gas Cases, supra note 8. 
 19. Sempra award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 83, 88-92; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 47-54; LG&E 
decision on liability, supra note 8,  ¶ 52; CMS award, supra note 8,  ¶ 58. 
 20.  The Convertibility Law is otherwise known as the Ley del Convertibilidad del Austral, Law 
No. 23928, Mar. 27, 1991, [27104] B.O. 1, available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/ 
anexos/0-4999/328/norma.htm. 
 21.  See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 388 (describing the privatization of the Argentine gas 
industry). 
 22.  LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶¶ 41, 53; CMS award, supra note 8,  ¶ 146. 
 23.  Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 389. 
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Argentina’s primary trading partner).24 A relaxed fiscal policy and 
increased public spending further exacerbated the country’s financial 
situation.25 In July 2001, Argentina’s stock market plummeted, and 
Argentina’s credit ratings were cut.26 The Argentine government enacted 
certain measures that tightened its budget and cut salaries by 13% in an 
effort to strengthen its financial position.27 Argentine nationals responded 
in protest with a 48-hour strike by state workers in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina’s capital city.28 
Withdrawals of bank deposits (approximately $1.3 billion in 
November 2001)29 also contributed to the liquidity problems, as account 
holders feared the government would freeze private bank accounts in order 
to service foreign indebtedness.30 These fears were realized when savings 
accounts were frozen in December of that year, and dollar-based accounts 
were redenominated into highly devalued pesos.31 Argentine nationals felt 
that “by seizing its citizens’ savings, the government ha[d] broken a basic 
contract, and violated the rule of law. Trust between government and 
citizens—the essential glue of a prosperous democracy—ha[d] been 
destroyed.”32 The frustrations of the Argentine people culminated in the 
succession of five presidents over a two-week period in December 2001.33 
In January 2002, banks closed their doors for most of the month, further 
complicating the situation.34 As unemployment skyrocketed to a quarter of 
the workforce, and with 44% of the population at or below the poverty 
line,35 social unrest and economic instability intensified.36 The Argentine 
economy had all but collapsed.37 Taken together, these events demonstrate 
 
 24.  A Decline Without Parallel: Argentina’s Collapse, THE ECONOMIST, Special Report, Mar. 2, 
2002, at 26-28, available at http://www.economist.com/node/1010911. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  The Events that Triggered Argentina’s Crisis, BBC NEWS, Dec. 21, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1721103.stm. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Argentines Protest Against Pay Cuts, BBC NEWS, Aug. 8, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/americas/1481313.stm. 
 29.  BBC NEWS, supra note 26. 
 30. Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 389. 
 31. Special Report, supra note 24. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 389 (citing generally to LG&E decision on liability, 
supra note 8, ¶ 63). 
 34.  Special Report, supra note 24; see also Larry Rohter, Bank Holiday and Creditors Add to 
Crisis in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/22/ 
world/bank-holiday-and-creditors-add-to-crisis-in-argentina.html. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 389. 
 37.  Special Report, supra note 24 (“The economy has ground almost to a halt, as the chain of 
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the “awe-inspiring severity of the economic, financial, political and social 
collapse that ha[d] befallen Latin America’s hitherto richest country and its 
third-largest economy.”38 
In January 2002, Argentina responded by enacting the Emergency 
Law, which abolished the 1991 Convertibility Law and mandated a 
renegotiation of many of the Gas Law regulations that had benefitted 
foreign investors.39 The Emergency Law also redenominated the dollar-
based tariff regime in pesos, and favorable tariff adjustments were 
discontinued in March 2002.40 Instability continued until President Néstor 
Kirchner took office in May 2003, after which the Argentine economy 
began to grow.41 A return to an investor-friendly tariff regime, however, in 
the gas sector has been successfully blocked by domestic court injunctions, 
despite government attempts to renegotiate tariff arrangements with the gas 
transportation and distribution companies.42 
B. Alleged Violations Under the U.S.–Argentina BIT 
The Argentine Gas Cases were brought against Argentina by private 
investors in Argentina’s natural gas industry pursuant to alleged violations 
of Argentina’s commitments under the U.S.–Argentina BIT. Four such 
investors, CMS, Enron, Sempra and LG&E, claimed that Argentina 
violated commitments to foreign investors under the U.S.–Argentina BIT, 
especially regarding the natural gas industry’s specialized tariff regime. 
Specifically, the investors claimed that Argentina had reneged on promises 
that (i) tariffs would be dollar-based and adjusted in accordance with the 
U.S. PPI, and (ii) the Argentine government would neither revoke nor 
otherwise alter the operating licenses described in Part I.A, above.43 By 
disregarding its guarantees of investor-friendly treatment, the foreign 
investors argued that the Argentine government had violated both Articles 
 
payments between consumers, businesses and suppliers has broken down. Cash is at a premium. All 
foreign-exchange transactions require the approval of the Central Bank, which has been slow to 
authorise them. So imports have all but dried up. In some ways, that is merely inconvenient: Chilean 
salmon, for example, is no longer on the menu at even the best restaurants in Buenos Aires. In others, it 
may be tragic: hospitals have run short of imported medicines.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39.  Law No. 25.561. Jan. 6, 2002, available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/ 
70000-74999/71477/texact.htm. For a description of the Emergency Law and its impact on the 
Argentine Economy, see Special Report, supra note 24.  
 40.  Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 389-90. 
 41.  Id. at 390 (citations omitted). 
 42.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 43.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 85-86; Enron award, supra note 8,  ¶ 88; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 85; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 42. 
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II and IV of the U.S.–Argentina BIT.44 Article II provides that foreign 
investments will not receive arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair, inequitable, 
or otherwise less favorable treatment than domestic investments and that 
both parties will observe any commitments they enter into with respect to 
investments.45 Article IV further provides that investments may only be 
expropriated for a public purpose, provided that the investor is 
compensated in a “prompt, adequate and effective” manner.46 Both the 
United States and Argentina are parties to ICSID, and the dispute 
resolution provision in Article VII of the U.S.–Argentina BIT provides for 
ICSID arbitration to resolve any conflicts arising thereunder.47 
Consequently, the investor-claimants in each of the Argentine Gas Cases 
instituted arbitration proceedings with ICSID in order to claim 
compensation for alleged violations of the BIT.48 
C. The Necessity Defense 
After a failed dispute over the arbitral tribunals’ jurisdiction in each of 
the four Argentine Gas Cases,49 Argentina responded by denying any 
 
 44.  Specifically, the investors claimed violations of the following provisions in Articles II and IV 
of the U.S.–Argentina BIT: “Article II(a) (guaranteeing “fair and equitable treatment,” “full protection 
and security” and treatment no “less than that required by international law”); Article II(2)(b) (barring 
“arbitrary” or “discriminatory” measures); Article II(2)(c) (the “umbrella clause” providing a guarantee 
by [Argentina] that it would “observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to 
investments); and Article VI(1) (ensuring compensation for direct or indirect expropriations or 
measures “tantamount” to expropriation).” Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 390-91 (citing the CMS 
award  ¶ 88, LG&E decision on liability  ¶ 72, Enron award  ¶ 87, and Sempra award  ¶ 94). 
 45.  U.S.–Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. II. Article II provides, in relevant part: 
Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full 
protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by 
international law. 
Neither party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the 
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of 
investments . . . 
Each party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments. 
 46.  U.S.–Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. IV. Article IV provides, in relevant part: 
    Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly through 
measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization except for public purpose; in a 
nondiscriminatory manner’ upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; 
and in accordance with due process of law and the general principles of investment provided 
for in Article II(2). 
 47.  See U.S.–Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. VII(3)(a)(i). 
 48.  For details regarding the filing dates and other procedural history related to the Argentine Gas 
Cases, see List of ICSID Cases, supra note 1. The website is searchable by case name. Alternatively, a 
list of international arbitration cases, searchable chronologically, alphabetically, and by claimant, is 
available at Alphabetical Listing by Respondent State, INT’L TREATY ARB., 
http://italaw.com/alphabetical_list_respondant.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 49.  Arbitration under ICSID permits a respondent state to challenge ICSID jurisdiction over the 
claim as a preliminary matter. See ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 32 (“Any objection by a party 
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breach of the U.S.–Argentina BIT with respect to the specific guarantees 
claimed by each of the investors. Argentina argued that the tariff regime 
guarantees were contingent on the 1991 Convertibility Law remaining in 
effect.50 Alternatively, Argentina argued that its liability for any such 
breach or otherwise wrongful act by Argentina would be precluded by (i) 
the customary international law doctrine of necessity, given the state of 
political and economic crisis in Argentina, and (ii) Article XI of the U.S.–
Argentina BIT, a non-precluded measures clause that limits investor 
protection in certain circumstances.51 In other words, Argentina’s necessity 
defense consisted of two prongs: first, a defense under customary 
international law; and second, a defense under Article XI of the U.S.–
Argentina BIT. Given the disagreement among the four tribunals as to the 
applicability of the customary law doctrine of necessity in light of Article 
XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT, Parts I.C.1 and I.C.2 below provide a 
description of both defenses in order to contextualize the tribunals’ and 
annulment committees’ debate over Argentina’s necessity defense. 
E. Customary International Law Doctrine of Necessity, or the CIL Defense 
In each of the Argentine Gas Cases, both Argentina and the investor-
claimants agreed that the customary international law doctrine of necessity 
is reflected in Article 25 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts.52 Article 25 states, in its entirety: 
 
 
 to the dispute that that dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre, or for other reasons is not  
within the competence of the Commission, shall be considered by the Commission which shall 
determine whether to deal with it as a preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the dispute.”). 
Provided that both parties have consented to jurisdiction, the ICSID Convention grants the relevant 
ICSID tribunal jurisdiction over the claim “to the exclusion of any other remedy.” Id. art. 26. In the 
Argentine Gas Cases, Argentina challenged ICSID jurisdiction by arguing that the conflicts were 
subject to Argentine Law, as opposed to international law. However, Argentina’s claim failed in each 
case, thereby permitting the relevant ICSID tribunal to judge the merits of each case. See CMS award, 
supra note 8, ¶¶ 112-14; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 203-04; Sempra award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 233-34; 
LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 81. 
 50.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 91; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 90; Sempra award, supra note 
8, ¶ 96; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 114. 
 51.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 99; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 93; Sempra award, supra note 
8, ¶ 98; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶¶ 201-02. In addition to arguing a defense of 
necessity under customary international law and under the U.S.–Argentina BIT, Argentina argued that 
liability was precluded under Argentine law; however, the CMS, Enron, and Sempra tribunals found 
that Argentina did not have a defense of necessity under domestic law. See CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 
227; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 218; Sempra award, supra note 8, ¶ 246. LG&E did not consider the 
issue. For a comparative analysis of the tribunals’ interpretations of the availability of a necessity 
defense under Argentine domestic law, see Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 402-04. 
 52.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 317; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 303; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 344; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 245. 
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1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international 
obligation of that State unless the act: 
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril; and 
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or 
States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole. 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding wrongfulness if: 
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility 
of invoking necessity; or 
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.53 
 
The weight of authority in international law accepts the customary 
international law doctrine of necessity, or the CIL Defense, as a valid 
defense against liability for wrongful acts or omissions by a state.54 While 
there are other possible defenses precluding liability for wrongful 
conduct,55 the CIL Defense is available only “under certain very limited 
conditions.”56 
Pursuant to Article 25 of the Draft Articles, all elements must be 
proved before the necessity defense can be claimed under customary 
international law. The first condition is that the measures taken must be the 
“only way” to preserve an “essential interest” of the state, which would 
otherwise be “impaired” because of a “grave and imminent peril.”57 The 
comments to paragraph 1(a) of Article 25 note that such a determination is 
dependent upon the facts of the case.58 Successfully meeting this element, 
however, requires that (i) no other lawful means was available to protect 
the interest (regardless of cost or convenience); (ii) the interest is particular 
 
 53.  Draft Articles, supra note 15, art. 25. 
 54.  Id. cmt. 3 at 80-81. 
 55.  Id. cmt. 2 at 80 (“The plea of necessity is exceptional in a number of respects. Unlike consent 
(art. 20), self-defence (art. 21) or countermeasures (art. 22), it is not dependent on the prior conduct of 
the injured State. Unlike force majeure (art. 23), it does not involve conduct which is involuntary or 
coerced. Unlike distress (art. 24), necessity consists not in danger to the lives of individuals in the 
charge of a State official but in a grave danger either to the essential interests of the State or of the 
international community as a whole. It arises where there is an irreconcilable conflict between an 
essential interest on the one hand and an obligation of the State invoking necessity on the other. These 
special features mean that necessity will only rarely be available to excuse non-performance of an 
obligation and that it is subject to strict limitations to safe-guard against possible abuse.”). See also 
Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 465-66. 
 56.  Draft Articles, supra note 15, art. 25, cmt. 14, at 83 (emphasis added). 
 57.  Id. cmt. 15, at 83. 
 58.  Id. 
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to the people, state, or international community, the “essential” character of 
which will be determined from surrounding circumstances; (iii) the interest 
is threatened at the time protective measures were taken; and (iv) the threat 
to the interest is serious and proximate, and not merely “apprehended or 
contingent.”59 The four components of the first element are subject to the 
requirement in paragraph 1(b) that the essential state interest “must 
outweigh all other considerations, not merely from the point of view of the 
acting State but on a reasonable assessment of the competing interests” of 
other states or the international community as a whole.60 
In addition to the conditions provided in paragraph 1, paragraph 2 
provides that any invocation of necessity is limited in two situations. Under 
paragraph 2(a), where “the international obligation in question explicitly or 
implicitly excludes reliance on necessity,” a state is prohibited from 
invoking a necessity defense.61 Thus, a state may not rely on necessity to 
avoid jus cogens, or a nonderogable, preemptory norm of international law. 
Under paragraph 2(b), a state party cannot rely on necessity if it has 
“contributed to the situation of necessity” in any substantial manner.62 
“Substantial” contribution does not include incidental or peripheral acts 
that would otherwise not be deemed as contributing to a state of 
necessity.63 
As noted above, successful invocation of the CIL Defense is not an 
easy task, as “both case law and commentary insist that this plea must be 
applied restrictively in order to prevent abuse and to avoid providing states 
with an easy excuse to avoid their international obligations.”64 The Draft 
Articles were neither developed in the specific context of international 
investment nor were they designed to resolve investor–state conflicts.65 
However, Article 25 permits (at least in theory) the invocation of the 
customary international law doctrine of necessity, and “there is room for 
disagreement about the precise boundaries of the doctrine at its farthest 
reaches, and of course in its application in any given case.”66 In other 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. cmt. 17, at 84. 
 61.  Id. cmt. 19, at 84.  
 62.  Id. cmt 20, at 84. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Song, supra note 16, at 248 (citing Vaughn Lowe, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007)). See also 
Draft Articles, supra note 15, art. 25, cmt. 2, at 80 (noting that the necessity defense “will only rarely be 
available to excuse non-performance of an obligation and that it is subject to strict limitations to safe-
guard against possible abuse”). 
 65.  Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 522. 
 66.  Id. at 474. This disagreement is discussed in Part II, infra, as the tribunals in the Argentine 
Gas Cases reached different conclusions regarding the various elements of the necessity defense. 
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words, although the CIL Defense only applies upon meeting a narrow set of 
requirements, a necessity defense may be claimed in a wide array of 
different situations.67 For example, the CIL Defense has been successfully 
invoked in military and environmental situations, in addition to certain 
economic situations.68 Argentina’s claim that “the very existence of the 
Argentine State was threatened by the events that began to unfold in 2000” 
suggests that it considered its socioeconomic situation sufficiently severe to 
invoke a CIL Defense pursuant to Article 25 of the Draft Articles.69 
F. Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT, or the NPM Exception 
In addition to a defense predicated on the customary international law 
doctrine of necessity, Argentina also claimed its liability for any breach of 
provisions contained in the U.S.–Argentina BIT was precluded by Article 
XI. Article XI provides, in its entirety: 
 
This treaty shall not preclude the application by either party of measures 
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security 
interests.70 
 
Such language is typical of a non-precluded measures clause, or NPM 
clause, a feature common to U.S. bilateral investment treaties.71 An NPM 
clause permits a state to contravene investor protections under a bilateral 
investment treaty in “exceptional circumstances” as necessary “for the 
protection of essential security the maintenance of public order, or to 
respond to a public health emergency.”72 In other words, a defense based 
on invoking an NPM clause, or an NPM Exception, allows a state to be 
absolved from liability where the state enacts emergency measures in 
 
 67.  See id. at 249. 
 68.  See Sarah F. Hill, The “Necessity Defense” and the Emerging Arbitral Conflict in its 
Application to the U.S.–Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 547, 551-57 
(2007) (providing examples of various international disputes in which the defense of necessity has been 
invoked in military and environmental situations, in addition to economic situations). Comments to 
Article 25 of the Draft Articles discuss the invocation of necessity in a variety of such situations, noting 
two particular cases that suggest a state of necessity in dire economic situations. See Draft Articles, 
supra note 15, art. 25, cmts. 3-12, at 80-82. 
 69.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 305. 
 70.  U.S.–Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. XI. 
 71.  William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary 
Times: the Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 313 (2008). 
 72.  Id. at 311. 
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response to a crisis situation. However, where the state acts pursuant to an 
NPM clause in a bilateral investment treaty, two issues arise. The first is 
the question of liability, or whether it is wrong for the state to take such 
necessary measures in light of the circumstances. If the NPM clause 
precludes liability, then such actions are not considered to violate the acting 
state’s obligation under the bilateral investment treaty.73 The second issue 
is the question of compensation, or whether a state is required to 
compensate an investor for damages sustained as a result of necessary 
measures. This second question is less well settled than the question of 
liability, and tribunals differ as to whether liability absolves a state from 
compensating investors for losses sustained. Argentina assumed a favorable 
position to both questions, arguing that the economic crisis triggered the 
NPM clause in Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT, thus precluding 
liability for any breach of investor protection mechanisms therein.74 
Consequently, Argentina claimed it was not liable to investors for losses 
resulting from emergency measures enacted pursuant to its NPM 
Exception. 
II. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE AS INTERPRETED IN THE 
ARGENTINE GAS CASES AND CORRESPONDING ANNULMENT 
DECISIONS 
Despite similar fact patterns and claims in the Argentine Gas Cases, 
“there was considerable disagreement among the [tribunals] about whether 
the measures adopted by the Argentine government could be defended as a 
response to the crisis faced by that country under Article XI of the [U.S.-
Argentina] BIT or the customary international law doctrine of necessity.”75 
While the CMS, Enron and Sempra tribunals76 ultimately held Argentina 
liable for violations of investor protection obligations under the U.S.–
Argentina BIT, the LG&E tribunal found in favor of Argentina.77 Further 
complicating the issue, the CMS, Enron and Sempra Awards were subject 
 
 73.  Id. at 312. 
 74.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 317-18; Enron supra note 8, ¶¶ 303-04, Sempra supra note 8, ¶¶ 
344-45, LG&E supra note 8, ¶ 245. 
 75.  Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 392. See also Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 474. 
 76.  These tribunals are so named for the investor-claimants involved in each case against 
Argentina. See Argentine Gas Cases, supra note 8. Thus the tribunal arbitrating the case of CMS v. 
Argentina, is referred to as the “CMS tribunal.” The same naming device applies to the tribunals in 
Enron v. Argentina, or the “Enron tribunal,” Sempra v. Argentina, or the “Sempra tribunal,” and LG&E 
v. Argentina, or the “LG&E tribunal.” 
 77.  The tribunals in the CMS award, Enron award, and Sempra award found against Argentina on 
the issue of necessity. See CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 331; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 313; Sempra 
award, supra note 8, ¶ 346. The LG&E decision on liability found in favor of Argentina on the issue of 
necessity. See LG&E, supra note 8, ¶¶ 239, 258-59. 
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to annulment proceedings with respect to Argentina’s necessity defense. 
The CMS Award was upheld despite the annulment committee’s 
disagreement with the analytical approach taken by the CMS tribunal, 
while the Enron and Sempra tribunals’ decisions on Argentina’s necessity 
defense were annulled based in part on the logic provided in the CMS 
annulment.78 In order to understand both the tribunals’ and subsequent 
annulment committees’ differing views on the correct interpretation and 
application of a necessity defense, this paper will first address the 
arbitration awards before moving to the annulment proceedings. 
A. Argentina’s Liability as Decided by the Original Arbitral Tribunals in 
CMS, Enron, Sempra and LG&E 
Although the Argentine Gas Cases each involved a similar fact 
pattern, the tribunals differed in their analysis of the facts and relevant law, 
with the result that three tribunals found against Argentina while one found 
in its favor. As a preliminary matter, however, all four tribunals agreed that 
Argentina violated its investor protection obligations under Articles II and 
IV of the U.S.–Argentina BIT.79 Specifically, the tribunals found that 
Argentina violated its obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment to 
the investors pursuant to Article II(2)(a) by enacting emergency measures 
that “entirely transformed and altered the legal and business environment 
under which the investments were made.”80 Argentina’s actions therefore 
violated investors’ legitimate expectations regarding the nature of the 
investment regime.81 The tribunals also found that Argentina had failed to 
respect its commitments for investor protection under Article II(2)(c), 
 
 78.  Both the Sempra award and the Enron award were annulled with respect to Argentina’s claim 
of necessity. See Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶¶ 204-08; Enron annulment decision, 
supra note 11, ¶ 395. The CMS award was not annulled, despite the annulment committee’s recognition 
of several “errors of law.” See CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 136. The LG&E decision on 
liability is presently undergoing an annulment proceeding, which was suspended as of August 1, 2011. 
See List of Pending Cases, supra note 11. 
 79.  Article II of the U.S.–Argentina BIT prohibits arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair, inequitable, or 
otherwise less favorable treatment of foreign investments relative to domestic investments and requires 
both parties to observe their respective investment obligations. See Article II of the U.S.–Argentina 
BIT, supra note 45. Article IV further provides that investments may only be expropriated for a public 
purpose, provided that the investor is compensated in a “prompt, adequate and effective” manner. See 
Article IV of the U.S.–Argentina BIT, supra note 46. 
 80.  Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 393 (citing as an example CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 
275). Regarding Article II(a), Alvarez & Khamsi also note that only the Enron and Sempra tribunals 
addressed and subsequently rejected the investors’ claims regarding the guarantee of full protection and 
security, and none of the tribunals addressed whether there was a breach of “treatment no less than that 
required by international law.” Id. at 395. 
 81.  See CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 281; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 267-68; Sempra award 
supra note 8, ¶¶ 303-04; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 175. 
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which requires Argentina to “observe any obligation it may have entered 
into with regard to investments.”82 However, each tribunal rejected claims 
of arbitrary treatment by Argentina, pursuant to Article II(2)(b), and all but 
the LG&E tribunal rejected claims of discriminatory treatment.83 With 
respect to Article IV(1), all tribunals rejected investors’ expropriation 
claims.84 
Having found Argentina liable for various violations of the U.S.–
Argentina BIT under Article II(2), the tribunals then turned to whether 
these breaches were excused by either a CIL Defense pursuant to Article 25 
of the Draft Articles or by an NPM Exception pursuant to the U.S.–
Argentina BIT. The tribunals agreed on several important issues regarding 
Argentina’s claimed necessity defense. First, each of the tribunals agreed 
that the purpose of a necessity defense is to preclude wrongfulness for a 
state’s actions during a period of crisis.85 Second, all tribunals agreed that 
Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT is not self-judging.86 That is, 
Argentina was not permitted to unilaterally determine whether conditions 
were such that they required Argentina to take measures in breach of the 
U.S.–Argentina BIT.87 Rather, the tribunals retained the right to decide 
whether Argentina had properly invoked the NPM Exception pursuant to 
Article XI.88 Third, the tribunals agreed that an economic crisis might 
constitute “essential security interests” under Article XI of the U.S.–
 
 82.  U.S.–Argentina BIT, supra note 14, art. II(2)(c). See CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 303; Enron 
award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 276-77; Sempra award supra note 8, ¶ 314; LG&E decision on liability, supra 
note 8, ¶ 175. 
 83.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 290-95; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 281-83; Sempra award 
supra note 8, ¶ 318; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶¶ 147-48, 161. 
 84.  All four tribunals rejected claims of indirect expropriation. CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 262-
64; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 245-46; Sempra award supra note 8, ¶¶ 283-86; LG&E decision on 
liability, supra note 8, ¶ 200. Only the Enron and Sempra tribunals considered, and subsequently 
rejected, claims of direct expropriation. See Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 243; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶¶ 280-82. 
 85.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 379-81; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 343; Sempra award supra 
note 8, ¶ 392; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 261. 
 86.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 373; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 332; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 385; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 212. 
 87.  See August Reinisch, Necessity in Investment Arbitration, 41 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L., 137, 142-
43 (I. F. Dekker and E. Hey eds., 2010) (noting that the occurrence of self-judging treaty provisions are 
“not frequent in international economic law” and usually not contained in bilateral investment treaties) 
(emphasis added). 
 88.  See CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 373; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 339-40; Sempra award, 
supra note 8, ¶ 338; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶¶ 212-14. For a detailed description of 
the reasoning behind the tribunals’ decision that Article XI is not self-judging, see Alvarez & Khamsi, 
supra note 3, at 417-26. But see Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 71, at 381-86 (arguing that 
Article XI is implicitly self-judging, and thus the tribunals erred in their decision that the provision was 
not self-judging). 
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Argentina BIT.89 Finally, with respect to the CIL Defense, each of the 
tribunals held that Article 25 of the Draft Articles was an accurate 
statement of the requirements for such a defense.90 
Despite the similarities discussed above, the tribunals’ analyses 
diverged significantly with respect to (i) the relationship between the CIL 
Defense, pursuant to Article 25 of the Draft Articles, and the NPM 
Exception, pursuant to Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT; (ii) whether 
Argentina’s claim successfully met each of the elements of necessity 
required for a CIL Defense; and (iii) whether or not successful invocation 
of the necessity defense under CIL or the NPM clause entitles investors to 
compensation for losses caused by Argentina’s emergency measures.91 
Each of these differences is individually discussed below. 
1.  The Tribunals’ Analysis of the Relationship Between the CIL 
Defense and the NPM Exception 
The relationship of the CIL Defense, pursuant to Article 25 of the 
Draft Articles, and the NPM Exception, pursuant to Article XI of the U.S.–
Argentina BIT, was addressed by each of the tribunals in the Argentine Gas 
Cases. The analysis, however, differed among tribunals. The CMS tribunal 
regarded the CIL Defense and the NPM Exception as being part of the 
same issue of claiming a necessity defense. The CMS tribunal, therefore, 
addressed the requirements for an NPM Exception under the U.S.–
Argentina BIT by referring to the elements required to invoke a CIL 
Defense under Article 25 of the Draft Articles.92 CMS, however, did not 
find that Argentina had met all of those elements.93 In contrast to the CMS 
tribunal, the Enron and the Sempra tribunals regarded the CIL Defense and 
the NPM Exception as two separate issues. In the opinion of both tribunals, 
Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT permitted Argentina to claim a 
necessity defense.94 Nevertheless, both tribunals determined that the 
appropriate analysis should look to customary international law, and 
specifically to Article 25 of the Draft Articles, because Article XI did not 
 
 89.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 359-60; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 332; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 374; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶¶ 237-38. See Article XI of the U.S.–
Argentina BIT, supra Part I.C.2. 
 90.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 315; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 303; Sempra award supra note 
8, ¶ 344; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 245. See Draft Articles, supra note 15, art. 25.  
 91. Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 395-96. 
 92.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 308, 353-58. Such an interpretation was not specifically 
provided by the CMS tribunal; however, the CMS annulment committee interpreted the CMS award in 
this manner. CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶¶ 124, 127. 
 93.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 331. 
 94. See Enron award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 333-34 (stating that the tribunal needed to evaluate the 
claim and then proceeding with this analysis); Sempra award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 375-76. 
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provide specific requirements for invoking such a defense.95 Like the CMS 
tribunal, both the Enron and Sempra tribunals found that the elements of a 
CIL Defense had not been met.96 
Additionally, both the Enron and Sempra tribunals took the 
relationship analysis a step further than the CMS tribunal, and rejected 
Argentina’s claim that Article XI of the U.S–Argentina BIT was lex 
specialis, or a “special rule of international law.”97 If Article XI were 
interpreted as lex specialis, it would preclude the application of other rules 
of international law, including customary international law and Article 25 
of the Draft Articles. However, absent any clear indication that both the 
United States and Argentina had intended Article XI to operate as lex 
specialis at the time the U.S–Argentina BIT was drafted, both tribunals 
refused to interpret an NPM Exception under Article XI as barring the 
applicability of a CIL Defense under Article 25 of the Draft Articles.98 
Like the Enron and Sempra tribunals, the LG&E tribunal found that an 
NPM Exception and a CIL Defense were two separate issues. In contrast to 
the other three tribunals, the LG&E tribunal found that Argentina’s 
emergency measures were excused as legitimate emergency measures in 
response to a crisis situation under Article XI.99 The LG&E tribunal also 
found that Argentina’s emergency measures were excused as the only 
means to respond to its economic crisis under Article 25 of the Draft 
Articles.100 Because Argentina’s emergency measures were excused under 
the U.S–Argentina BIT and customary international law, the LG&E 
tribunal found that distinguishing between the NPM Exception and the CIL 
Defense was “not particularly significant.”101 
2.  Tribunal’s Analysis of the Elements of a CIL Defense 
In addition to differences over the relationship of the CIL Defense and 
the NPM Exception, each of the tribunals also varied in their application of 
Article 25 of the Draft Articles in determining whether Argentina had 
successfully met the conditions for a CIL Defense. The conditions to be 
satisfied for a successful CIL Defense pursuant to Article 25 are described 
in paragraph (1), which provides the requirements for the invocation of the 
necessity defense, and paragraph (2), which limits the necessity defense in 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 313; Sempra award, supra note 8, ¶ 346. 
 97.  Draft Articles, supra note 15, art. 55, cmts. 1-2, at 140. 
 98.  Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 398 (citing the Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 334, and the 
Sempra award, supra note 8, ¶ 378). 
 99.  LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 240. 
 100.  Id. ¶ 257. 
 101.  Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 397. 
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certain situations. 
With respect to the elements of necessity pursuant to Article 
25(1)(a),102 the tribunals disagreed whether Argentina had an “essential 
interest” at stake and whether it was subject to “grave and imminent peril.” 
The CMS tribunal found that the crisis was severe “enough to justify the 
government taking action to prevent a . . . total economic collapse.”103 
Despite the severity and proximity of the crisis, the tribunal did not find 
that Argentina had satisfied these requirements.104 The Enron and Sempra 
tribunals likewise found that the crisis was severe, but not severe enough to 
threaten “the very existence of the state and its independence,” especially 
since Argentina had not provided sufficient evidence to convince the 
tribunal that the political and economic situation was sufficiently severe to 
require Argentina to violate obligations to investors under the U.S.–
Argentina BIT.105 In contrast, the LG&E tribunal found that Argentina’s 
economic crisis seriously compromised the nation’s internal state of affairs, 
and was therefore an “essential interest.”106 The evidence presented to the 
tribunal proved, to the tribunal’s satisfaction, that Argentina’s essential 
interest was affected by a grave and proximate danger.107 The tribunals 
further disagreed whether Argentina’s actions were the “only means” 
available. Without specifying other ways in which Argentina could have 
responded to the economic crisis, the CMS, Enron and Sempra tribunals all 
found that the emergency measures undertaken by Argentina were not the 
only means available.108 
With respect to the impairment of other nations’ essential interests as 
per Article 25(1)(b),109 none of the tribunals found an impairment of an 
essential state interest of any other state.110 Specifically, the CMS, Enron 
 
 102.  Article 25(1)(a) requires that any act taken pursuant to necessity “is the only way for the State 
to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril[.]” See Draft Articles, supra note 
15, art. 25, at 80.  
 103.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 322. 
 104.  Id. ¶¶ 319-22. 
 105.  Enron award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 306-07; Sempra award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 348-49. 
 106.  LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶¶ 251-52. 
 107.  Id. ¶¶ 253, 257. 
 108.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 323-24; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 308; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 350. The Enron and Sempra tribunals further stated that an inquiry into other available 
responses to the economic crisis would be outside of the scope of the tribunals’ jurisdiction. See Enron 
award, supra note 8, ¶ 309; Sempra award, supra note 8, ¶ 351. 
 109.  Article 25(1)(b) requires that any act taken pursuant to necessity “does not seriously impair an 
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole[.]” See Draft Articles, supra note 15, art. 25, at 80. 
 110.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 357-58; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 341; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 390; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 257. 
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and Sempra tribunals found no impairment of an essential interest of the 
United States, as the state “towards which the obligation [under the U.S.–
Argentina BIT] exists.”111 The CMS, Enron and Sempra Tribunals also 
found no impairment of the essential interests of the international 
community as a whole.112 The LG&E tribunal, however, did not address 
this element of Article 25. 
With respect to the ability to invoke a necessity defense under the 
U.S.–Argentina BIT, pursuant to Article 25(2)(a),113 the CMS tribunal 
found that a necessity defense was not barred by the U.S.–Argentina BIT in 
general, but was precluded in Argentina’s case because Argentina did not 
face a sufficiently serious economic situation to invoke a CIL Defense.114 
The Enron and Sempra tribunals merely stated that the CIL defense should 
be interpreted narrowly, but neither tribunal otherwise directly addressed 
the issue.115 Like CMS, the LG&E tribunal found that the U.S.–Argentina 
BIT permitted a plea of necessity, although it reached the opposite result 
with respect to Argentina’s ability to invoke such a defense.116 
Finally, with respect to whether Argentina contributed to the 
economic crisis, or Argentina’s “situation of necessity,” under Article 
25(2)(b),117 the CMS, Enron and Sempra tribunals found that the policies of 
the Argentine government had largely contributed to the economic crisis, 
thereby precluding a necessity defense.118 By contrast, the LG&E tribunal 
found that Argentina had not contributed to the crisis, based on the 
investors’ failure to prove that Argentina contributed to the economic crisis 
and government efforts to reduce its severity.119 Despite varied analyses of 
the different elements required for a CIL Defense under Article 25 of the 
Draft Articles, each of the CMS, Enron and Sempra tribunals found that 
Argentina had failed to meet the requisite elements, while the LG&E 
tribunal found that the elements were satisfied. 
 
 111.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 357-58; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 341; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 390. 
 112.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 325; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 310; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 352. 
 113.  Article 25(2)(a) prohibits the necessity defense where “the international obligation in question 
excludes the possibility of invoking necessity[.]” Draft Articles, supra note 15, art. 25, at 80. 
 114.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 353-55. 
 115.  Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 331; Sempra award, supra note 8, ¶ 373. 
 116.  LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶¶ 255, 259. 
 117.  Article 25(2)(b) prohibits the necessity defense where “the State has contributed to the 
situation of necessity.” Draft Articles, supra note 15, art. 25, at 80. 
 118. CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 379-82; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 311-13; Sempra award, 
supra note 8, ¶¶ 353-54. 
 119.  LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶¶ 257-59. 
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3.  Tribunal’s Analysis of the Compensation Requirement 
Each of the tribunals in the Argentine Gas Cases agreed that, where 
the elements of a CIL Defense are sufficiently proved under Article 25 of 
the Draft Articles, a state is not liable for wrongful actions during the 
period of necessity under Article 27.120 However, the Tribunals disagreed 
as to whether compensation would be due for violations under the U.S.–
Argentina BIT despite a successful invocation of the CIL Defense. The 
CMS, Enron and Sempra Tribunals found that the CIL Defense did not 
remove the requirement to compensate investors for losses or damages 
incurred as a result of the state’s actions during a crisis situation.121 The 
tribunals also implied that a crisis situation would be considered in 
determining the amount of compensation due.122 The LG&E tribunal took 
the opposite position, arguing that because the CIL Defense excuses a state 
from liability, it follows logically that the state should not be required to 
compensate investors for losses or damages sustained during a period of 
crisis.123 However, where investors incurred losses as a result of state 
actions unrelated to the crisis situation, the LG&E tribunal determined that 
the investor should be compensated for such losses.124 
B. Argentina’s Liability Under the CMS, Enron and Sempra Annulment 
Proceedings 
As discussed above, the CMS, Enron and Sempra decisions were all 
subject to annulment proceedings, pursuant to Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention.125 The grounds for annulment under the ICSID Convention are 
narrow and are limited to improper constitution of a tribunal, “manifest 
excess of powers” by a tribunal, corruption of a tribunal member, a 
“serious departure from a fundamental rule or procedure,” or failure “to 
 
 120.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶¶ 379-82; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 343; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 392; LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 261. Article 27 of the Draft Articles provides 
in its entirety: 
The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in accordance with this chapter is 
without prejudice to: 
(a)  compliance with the obligation in question, if and to the extent that the circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness no longer exists; 
(b)  the question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in question. Draft 
Articles, supra note 15, art. 27 at 85. 
 121.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 388; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 345; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 394. 
 122.  CMS award, supra note 8, ¶ 356; Enron award, supra note 8, ¶ 407; Sempra award, supra 
note 8, ¶ 346. 
 123.  LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 264.  
 124.  LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶ 265.  
 125.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, art. 52. 
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state the reasons” for a tribunal’s decision.126 
Finding that the tribunals’ awards met the criteria for annulment in 
Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention, the Enron and Sempra annulment 
committees annulled the portions of the tribunal awards that dealt with 
Argentina’s necessity defense.127 Although the CMS Award was not 
annulled, the annulment committee found a “manifest error of law” with 
respect to the tribunal’s interpretation of the necessity defense.128 Yet, 
because this error did not amount to a “manifest excess of powers” by the 
tribunal, the annulment committee declined to annul the CMS award with 
respect to Argentina’s necessity defense.129 No annulment decision has 
been issued with respect to the LG&E decision on liability, as the 
annulment proceeding has been suspended by agreement of both parties.130 
By way of comparison, the CMS, Sempra and Enron annulment 
committees differed with the tribunals (and with each other) over the 
relationship between a CIL Defense under Article 25 of the Draft Articles 
and an NPM Exception under Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT. The 
Enron annulment committee further disagreed with the Enron tribunal’s 
decision that the conditions for the necessity defense under Article 25 of 
the Draft Articles had not been sufficiently proved by Argentina.131 
Moreover, the CMS and Enron annulment committees all rejected the 
respective tribunals’ conclusions that a CIL Defense requires compensation 
for losses or damages sustained by the investors, while the Sempra 
annulment committee did not directly address this issue. These differences 
are discussed below. 
 
 126.  Id. art. 52(1)(a)–(e). As noted by the CMS annulment committee, errors in legal analysis are 
not grounds for annulment. Where the tribunal applies the law, albeit “cryptically and defectively,” the 
tribunal did not engage in a “manifest excess of powers.” See CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, 
¶ 136.  
 127.  Enron annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 222; Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, 
¶ 405. Though other portions of the Enron and Sempra awards were also annulled, they are outside of 
the scope of this paper and, accordingly, will not be addressed. 
 128.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 130.  
 129.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 136. Specifically, the annulment committee stated 
“that it has only a limited jurisdiction under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. In the circumstances, 
the Committee cannot simply substitute its own view of the law and its own appreciation of the facts for 
those of the tribunal.” Id. Because the tribunal applied article XI of the Treaty, albeit doing so 
“cryptically and defectively” the tribunal did not exceed its power under the ICSID convention. Id.  
 130.  The annulment proceeding was registered on September 19, 2008, and the status of the 
proceeding was pending as of August 1, 2001. See List of Pending Cases, supra note 11.  
 131.  The CMS and Sempra annulment decisions did not address this issue. 
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1.  Annulment Committees’ Analysis of the Relationship between 
the CIL Defense and the NPM Exception 
The CMS and Sempra annulment committees found that the tribunals 
made certain legal errors in their analysis of the relationship between a CIL 
Defense under Article 25 of the Draft Articles and an NPM Exception 
under Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT. First, both annulment 
committees disagreed with the respective tribunals’ failure to distinguish 
between the CIL Defense and the NPM Exception.132 Both annulment 
committees noted significant differences in the language adopted in both 
provisions: Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT refers to “measures 
necessary” that “specif[y] the conditions under which the treaty may be 
applied,” while Article 25 of the Draft Articles refers to a “state of 
necessity” that only applies where “certain conditions are met.”133 In the 
words of the CMS tribunal, “Article XI is a threshold requirement: if it 
applies, the substantive obligations under the [U.S.–Argentina BIT] do not 
apply. By contrast, Article 25 is an excuse which is only relevant once it 
has been decided that there has otherwise been a breach of those 
substantive obligations.”134 Thus the NPM Exception bars the application 
of other provisions of the U.S.–Argentina BIT, suggesting that there can be 
no breach of the U.S.–Argentina BIT when an NPM Exception has been 
successfully invoked. an NPM Exception therefore operates differently 
than a CIL Defense, which is only available after provisions of the U.S.–
Argentina BIT have been breached. Given the plain language of both 
provisions, it was clear to the annulment committees that the provisions 
were “substantively different.”135 
Although the CMS annulment committee concluded its analysis with 
the difference in operative language, the Sempra annulment committee 
took the analysis a step further. The Sempra annulment committee 
 
 132.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 129; Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 
204, 208.  
 133.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 129; see also Sempra annulment decision, supra 
note 11, ¶ 203.  
 134.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 129. The Sempra annulment decision presents a 
side-by-side comparison of the texts of both Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT and Article 25 of the 
Draft Articles, noting that “Article 25 presupposes that an act has been committed that is incompatible 
with the State’s international obligations and is therefore “wrongful.” Article XI, on the other hand, 
provides that “This Treaty shall not preclude” certain measures so that, where Article XI applies, the 
taking of such measures is not incompatible with the state’s international obligations and is not 
therefore “wrongful.” The Sempra annulment committee therefore concluded that Article 25 of the 
Draft Articles and Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT deal with quite different situations. Sempra 
annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 198–200.  
 135.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 130; see also Sempra annulment decision, supra 
note 11, ¶ 203.  
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suggested that, contrary to the tribunal’s interpretation, the CIL Defense 
under Article 25 of the Draft Articles should not be imported to a NMP 
Defense under Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT. While, “it may be 
appropriate to look to customary law as a guide to the interpretation of the 
terms used in the U.S.–Argentina BIT[,] it does not follow however that 
customary law . . . establishes a preemptory ‘definition of necessity and the 
conditions for its operations.’”136 By contrast, the Enron annulment 
committee found that the tribunal’s reasons for concluding that Article 25 
of the Draft Articles had “the same or similar meaning” as Article XI of the 
U.S.–Argentina BIT were “sufficiently clear,” and therefore refused to 
determine the appropriateness of the tribunal’s interpretation.137 
Despite the divergence between the CMS and Sempra annulment 
committees’ interpretations of the relationship between the CIL Defense 
and the NPM Exception, both annulment committees agreed that Article XI 
operated as lex specialis to the extent that Argentina successfully 
demonstrated a crisis situation sufficient to create a “state of necessity.”138 
Analysis under Article 25 of the Draft Articles therefore serves as a 
“secondary rule of international law” such that the original tribunal was 
obliged to first determine whether Article XI excused Argentina’s breach 
of the U.S.–Argentina BIT.139 Only if the tribunal determined that an NPM 
Exception was unavailable, should the tribunal have then determined 
whether a CIL Defense excused Argentina’s actions.140 Conversely, the 
Enron annulment committee found that it was within the tribunal’s 
discretion to decide if and how Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT and 
Article 25 of the Draft Articles were to be integrated.141 The CMS 
annulment committee therefore concluded that the tribunal properly 
exercised its discretion in determining that an NPM Exception must be 
proved by reference to the elements of a CIL Defense. 
 
 136.  Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 197.  
 137.  Enron annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 403. The Enron annulment committee explicitly 
disagreed with the CMS annulment decision’s analysis that Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT and 
Article 25 of the Draft Articles were different, viewing such analysis as outside of the scope of the 
tribunal’s authority. Id. ¶ 405.  
 138.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 133; Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 
208–9. 
 139.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 134; Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 
203–4.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Enron annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 405. The annulment committee justified this 
decision by claiming that “the role of an annulment committee is not to reach its own conclusions on 
these issues, but to determine whether the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers in reaching the 
conclusion that it did, or whether the tribunal failed to state reasons for reaching the conclusion that it 
did.” Id. 
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The divergence among the CMS, Sempra and Enron annulment 
committees may be significant for pending claims against Argentina. Under 
both a CIL Defense pursuant to Article 25 of the Draft Articles and an 
NPM Exception pursuant to Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT, 
Argentina is excused from liability for certain emergency measures taken 
in response to its economic crisis. However, as noted by the LG&E 
tribunal, Article 25 of the Draft Articles requires the state’s emergency 
measure to be the only available response, while Article XI may permit any 
response, whether or not it is the only response available, so long as the 
response was necessary to mitigate the crisis.142 Following the LG&E 
tribunal’s analysis, it appears that an NPM Exception under Article XI of 
the U.S.–Argentina BIT excuses a wider range of emergency measures than 
a CIL Defense under Article 25 of the Draft Articles. For future tribunals 
following the LG&E tribunal’s analysis, distinguishing Article XI as lex 
specialis may work in Argentina’s favor. If Article XI is deemed lex 
specialis (under the CMS and Sempra annulment committees’ analysis) 
Argentina may have wider discretion in claiming a necessity defense, than 
would otherwise be available where tribunals may determine the 
relationship between Article XI and Article 25 on an ad hoc basis (under 
the Enron annulment committee’s analysis). 
Interestingly, the agreement between the CMS and Sempra annulment 
committees resulted in opposing conclusions. Both annulment committees 
addressed the issue of annulment by determining whether the tribunal had 
exercised “a manifest excess of powers” pursuant to Article 52 of the 
ICSID Convention.143 While the tribunal’s failure to apply the relevant law 
was grounds for possible annulment, the tribunal’s misapplication of the 
relevant law was insufficient.144 The CMS annulment committee did not 
find that the errors of law described above amounted to a “manifest excess 
of power,” despite the fact that the “errors made by the tribunal could have 
had a decisive impact on the operative part of the award.”145 Taking special 
notice of the limited nature of its authority under Article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention, the CMS annulment committee concluded that the tribunal had 
applied the relevant law, albeit “cryptically and defectively,” and therefore 
had not engaged in a manifest excess of powers that would otherwise result 
 
 142.  LG&E decision on liability, supra note 8, ¶239–40. 
 143.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶¶ 135–36, Sempra annulment decision, supra note 
11, ¶¶ 205–06.  
 144.  Id.  
 145.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 135. The CMS annulment committee further noted 
that “if the Committee was acting as a court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the Award on this 
ground.” Id.  
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in annulment.146 Applying the same logic, the Sempra annulment 
committee concluded that the tribunal’s application of Article 25 of the 
Draft Articles to the exclusion of Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT 
amounted to a “failure to apply the law” and was therefore a manifest 
excess of powers sufficient for annulment.147 The Sempra annulment 
committee went further, however, by defining and interpreting a “manifest 
error” as one that is “plain,” “clear” or “obvious.”148 This compelled the 
Sempra annulment committee’s conclusion that “it is obvious from a 
simple reading of the reasons of the tribunal that it did not identify or apply 
Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT as the applicable law.” 
2.  Enron Annulment Committee’s Analysis of the Elements of a CIL 
Defense 
Unlike the CMS and Sempra annulment committees, which did not 
consider the issue, the Enron annulment committee considered and rejected 
the portion of the Enron tribunal’s analysis that addressed whether the 
elements of a CIL Defense had been met. The Enron annulment committee 
was satisfied with the tribunal’s analysis of the “essential interest” and 
“grave and imminent peril” requirements pursuant to Article 25(1)(a).149 
However, the annulment committee found that the tribunal failed to address 
“a number of issues that are essential to the question of whether the “only 
way” requirement was met.”150 The annulment committee also found that 
the tribunal’s reliance on an economist as an expert regarding other 
possible responses to the economic crisis was tantamount to a failure to 
apply the law and therefore grounds for annulment. In the annulment 
committee’s view, the tribunal was required to determine whether the “only 
way” requirement was satisfied from a legal point of view, “and not merely 
whether, from an economic perspective, there were other options available 
for dealing with the economic crisis.”151 In accepting the expert’s opinions, 
the annulment committee also found that the tribunal had failed to give 
reasons for so doing, which is also grounds for annulment. 152 The 
annulment committee found that the tribunal did not explicitly state 
whether the requirements of Article 25(1)(b) were met.153 Therefore the 
annulment committee was unable to determine whether the tribunal made 
 
 146.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 136.  
 147.  Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶¶ 206–08.  
 148.  Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 211. 
 149.  Enron annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 360.  
 150.  Id. ¶¶ 368, 373.  
 151.  Id. ¶ 377.  
 152.  Id. ¶ 378.  
 153.  Id. ¶ 384.  
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such a finding.154 Even if the tribunal did find that Article 25(1)(b) was 
satisfied, the annulment committee decided that the tribunal had failed to 
provide reasons for such a finding, which is grounds for annulment.155 
Concerning the limitations to the necessity defense provided in Article 
25(2) of the Draft Articles, the annulment committee found that the tribunal 
did not determine whether the U.S.–Argentina BIT “excludes the 
possibility of invoking necessity” under Article 25(2)(a). However, the 
annulment committee did find that the tribunal failed to apply Article 
25(2)(b) by instead focusing on the expert opinion discussed above, which 
was sufficient grounds for annulment.156 In the words of the annulment 
committee, “[w]hile an economist might regard a state’s economic policies 
as misguided . . . that would not itself necessarily mean that as a matter of 
law, the State had “contributed to the situation of necessity” such as to 
preclude reliance on the principle of necessity under customary 
international law.”157 
Because of the various “annullable errors” in the Enron tribunal’s 
analysis of the requirements for a necessity defense, the Enron annulment 
committee annulled the tribunal’s decision that Argentina had not 
successfully claimed a necessity defense (based on the tribunal’s analysis 
of a CIL Defense).158 Although the Enron annulment committee did not 
adopt as generous a position as the LG&E tribunal, it appears that the 
annulment committee did withdraw from the more stringent standards 
required by the original CMS, Enron and Sempra tribunals to claim a CIL 
Defense.159 
3. Annulment Committees’ Analysis of the Compensation 
Requirement 
Notwithstanding other disagreements regarding substantive law 
discussed above, the CMS and Enron annulment committees agreed that no 
compensation was due for Argentina’s actions during the economic 
crisis.160 Insofar as an NPM Exception under Article XI of the U.S.–
Argentina BIT absolved Argentina from liability for damages caused by the 
emergency measures taken in response to the economic crisis, the CMS 
 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id.  
 156.  Id. ¶ 393.  
 157.  Id.  
 158.  Id. ¶ 395.  
 159.  For description of the standards adopted by the CMS, Enron, Sempra, and LG&E tribunals, 
see infra Part II.A.2.  
 160.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 146; Enron annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 
414.  
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annulment committee found that “there could be no possibility of 
compensation being payable during that period.”161 The CMS annulment 
committee further decided that the tribunal made a manifest error of law 
regarding Article 27 of the Draft Articles, which provides for compensation 
in certain situations regardless of a successful CIL Defense. According to 
the CMS annulment committee, the tribunal failed to first consider 
compensation under the U.S.–Argentina BIT before addressing the issue 
under Article 27, as required where Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT 
operates as lex specialis relative to the Draft Articles.162 The Enron 
annulment committee took a similar position regarding the compensation 
question, finding that “there can be no obligation to pay compensation in 
the absence of any liability.”163 However, because the Enron tribunal’s 
finding on liability was annulled, Argentina owed no compensation to the 
investor-claimants irrespective of the necessity defense. Although the 
Sempra annulment committee acknowledged that Argentina raised the 
issue of compensation under Article 27,164 the annulment committee did 
not directly address the issue in its analysis of Argentina’s necessity 
defense. 
III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
The divergent opinions of the tribunals and annulment committees in 
the Argentine Gas Cases have significant implications for international 
investment. Conflicting analyses and results raise questions about the 
future security of foreign investment, since international investment law is 
designed to support economic development by protecting the interests of 
foreign investors. Analysis of the Argentine Gas Cases reflects a 
widespread concern about inconsistency in international investment law 
and its ramifications for the legitimacy of the ICSID regime. Further, 
repercussions from conflicting tribunal awards and annulment committee 
decisions are evidenced by state policy concerns over the response to 
economic or financial crisis situations. Given the proliferation of bilateral 
investment treaties and the corresponding increase in ICSID disputes, these 
concerns are of primary importance and warrant the special attention of 
international investment law scholars, practitioners and policy-makers in 
the realm of international investment law. 
 
 161.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 146.  
 162.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶146. See also Article 27, supra note 120.  
 163.  Enron annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 414. 
 164.  Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 179.  
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A. Security for Foreign Investment 
The preamble of the ICSID Convention emphasizes “the need for 
international cooperation for economic development and the role of the 
private international investment therein.”165 This reflects the notion that 
“the common interest underpinning international investment law is 
economic development through foreign investment for capital-importing 
states and security of such investment for private actors in capital-exporting 
states.”166 The importance of secure investments is evidenced by the 142 
cases currently pending with ICSID167 and over 2,750 bilateral investment 
treaties that were concluded as of 2009.168 In light of the specific objectives 
of ICSID and of international investment law in general, understanding the 
positions taken by the annulment committees are relevant for the security 
of foreign investment “because they may be outcome-determinative and 
critically affect the general balance between the regulatory freedoms on the 
part of a host state’s government in times of national emergencies and the 
protections afforded to the investments of foreign investors.”169 
One perspective is that the Enron and Sempra Annulment Decisions 
actually compromise, rather than protect, the security of future foreign 
investments.170 Both the Enron and Sempra annulment committees found 
annullable error in the tribunals’ analysis of Argentina’s necessity defense, 
reaching a result that directly contradicts the earlier CMS Annulment 
Decision. As discussed above, the CMS annulment committee concluded 
that the CMS tribunal had applied the relevant law, though erroneously, 
and therefore had not exercised a “manifest excess of powers.”171 This 
result was based on the distinction between the failure to apply the relevant 
 
 165.  ICSID Convention, supra note 13, pmbl.  
 166. Bart M. J. Szewczyk, Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, International 
Decisions, 105(3) Am. J. Int’l L., 547, 550 (2011). For a similar perspective from the practitioner’s 
point of view, see Steven Smith & Kevin Rubino, Investors Beware: Enron and Sempra 
AnnulmentDecisions Bolster the State of Necessity Defense While Sowing New Uncertainty regarding 
the Finality of ICSID Arbitral Awards, O’MELVENY AND MEYERS LLP, Aug. 9, 2010, 
http://www.omm.com/investors-beware--enron-sempra-annulment-decisions-bolster-state-necessity-
defense-while-sowing-new-uncertainty-regarding-finality-of-icsid-arbitral-awards-08-09-2010/.  
 167.  See List of Pending Cases, supra note 11.  
 168.  See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2010 – 
Investing in a LowCarbon Economy, 81 (2010), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ 
wir2010_en.pdf; see also Szewczyk, supra note 166, at 550.  
 169.  Andreas von Staden, Towards Greater Clarity in Investor-State Arbitration: The CMS, 
Sempra, and Enron annulment decisions, 2 CZECH Y.B. OF INT’L L., 207, 210 (2011).  
 170.  The CMS, Enron and Sempra annulments have sparked a great deal of scholarly debate. See 
e.g., Szewczyk, supra note 166; von Staden, supra note 169; Reinisch, supra note 16; Schill, supra note 
16; Michael Waibel, Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E, 20 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L. L. 637 (2007).  
 171.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 136. 
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law and a misapplication or misinterpretation of the relevant law.172 The 
former is a manifest excess of powers and grounds for annulment under 
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, while the latter is insufficient grounds 
for annulment.173 Although both the Enron and Sempra annulment 
committees recognized this distinction, it is questionable whether the 
committees fully appreciated the distinction in their analysis. One 
commentator has argued that “[t]he Sempra annulment decision eviscerated 
this fundamental distinction by construing a misinterpretation of treaty text, 
which was understood by the tribunal in light of customary law, as an utter 
failure to apply the treaty provision.”174 Instead of interpreting the 
tribunal’s conclusion (an NPM Exception pursuant to Article XI of the 
U.S.–Argentina BIT did not apply because of Argentina’s failure to prove 
the requirements of CIL Defense under Article 25 of the Draft Articles175) 
as a failure to apply Article XI, the Sempra annulment committee arguably 
should have interpreted the tribunal’s conclusion as merely a 
misinterpretation of Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT.176 Accordingly, 
the difference in the Sempra and CMS annulment committees’ conclusions 
demonstrates the possibility that “all errors of law [are] potential grounds 
for annulment, as any misinterpretation of proper law could be equated to 
nonapplication of proper law.”177 
The Enron annulment committee reached the same conclusion as the 
Sempra annulment committee, but for different reasons. As discussed in 
Part II.B.2,the Enron annulment committee found a “manifest excess of 
power” in the tribunal’s analysis of whether Argentina had satisfied the 
requirements of Article 25 of the Draft Articles. The annulment committee 
concluded there was a “failure to apply the applicable law” in the tribunal’s 
mere acceptance of an economist’s opinion on an economic issue as 
dispositive of whether Argentina had committed to its state of necessity.178 
Yet contrary to both the CMS and Sempra annulment committees, the 
Enron annulment committee concluded that it was within the scope of the 
tribunal’s authority to determine the interrelationship of an NPM Exception 
under Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT and a CIL Defense under 
 
 172.  Id.; see also CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 938 (2d 
ed. 2009) (describing the difference between a failure to apply the law, which is grounds for annulment, 
and a failure to apply the law correctly, which is not).  
 173.  CMS annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶¶ 135–36; Enron annulment decision, supra note 
11, ¶ 68; Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶¶ 205–06.  
 174.  Szewczyk, supra note 136, at 551. 
 175.  Sempra annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶¶ 216–17. 
 176. Szewczyk, supra note 136, at 551. 
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Enron annulment decision, supra note 11, ¶ 393.  
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Article 25 of the Draft Articles. However, the Enron annulment committee, 
like the Sempra Annulment committee, annulled the tribunal’s finding as to 
Argentina’s necessity defense.179 The Enron annulment decision thus 
engenders further confusion about precisely what is required for a necessity 
defense. 
An alternate perspective is that, despite conflicting decisions issued by 
the annulment committees, the decisions “represent a great improvement in 
terms of doctrinal clarity as well as for the potential uses of the annulment 
procedure in the future.”180 This position argues for applying a “substantive 
meaning” rather than a mere textual analysis, since “applying the proper 
law is not exhausted by paying lip service to the text in which it is clothed, 
but rather requires that its content is observed.”181 This suggests that the 
Sempra annulment decision, in which the annulment committee concluded 
that Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT and Article 25 of the Draft 
Articles were not integrable, was the correct analysis.182 Had the Sempra 
annulment committee instead looked to the ordinary meaning of the terms 
of Article XI, its analysis would be frustrated by the “observable range of 
alternative interpretations” of the relevant terms “necessary,” “public 
order,” and “essential security interest.”183 Given the existence of 
alternative interpretations of the terms of Article XI, there can be “no single 
ordinary meaning, [and] by the same token, such ordinary meaning cannot 
simply be found in the necessity defense either.”184 
Similarly, the Enron annulment committee’s substantive review of the 
elements of a CIL Defense under Article 25 of the Draft Articles was the 
proper analysis, given that none of the terms in Article 25 “is so obvious as 
to obviate the need for interpretation,” without which “the application of 
these elements becomes impossible.”185 For example, the requirement 
under Article 25(2)(b) that the state must not have “contributed to the state 
of necessity” for the CIL defense to apply raises questions about what types 
of activities constitute contribution for purposes of Article 25(2)(b). By 
undertaking a substantive analysis in the rendering of their decisions, both 
the Enron and Sempra annulment committees ensure, “inter alia, that the 
arbitrator has recognized, understood, and applied established principles 
 
 179.  Id. ¶ 395.  
 180.  von Staden, supra note 169, at 211.  
 181.  Id. at 223.  
 182.  Id. at 224 (citing William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in 
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L. L. 307, 337–68 (2008)).  
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Id.  
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and rules of law in a comprehensible and justifiable manner.”186 Although 
there may be disagreement among commentators and practitioners alike as 
to whether the CMS, Enron, or Sempra annulment committees reached the 
correct result, the annulment committees’ observations “on the basic 
doctrinal parameters regarding the relationship between treaty law and 
customary law, and the interpretation and application of each, are great 
improvements over much of what can be found in the underlying tribunal 
awards.”187 These improvements are threefold: (i) treaty provisions operate 
as lex specialis (except where in conflict with jus cogens norms) relative to 
customary international law, (ii) distinguishing rules governing the scope 
of an obligation from those governing consequences of breaching such 
obligation, and (iii) an emphasis on careful interpretation involving both 
textual and substantive analysis.188 The Annulment Decisions should be 
therefore appreciated for their improvements to the ICSID system, which 
affords investors security in terms of stability and predictability of the 
analysis of investor-state disputes under bilateral investment treaties.189 
Despite the alternative interpretations of the CMS, Enron, and Sempra 
annulment decisions discussed above, a collective analysis of the 
interpretive legal errors recognized by the CMS annulment committee and 
the annullable legal errors recognized by the Sempra and Enron annulment 
committees lends itself to the possibility of a re-evaluation of the 
requirements for successful invocation of the necessity defense.190 While 
the annulment committees may have provided guidance for the analytical 
process of interpreting competing rules of law, their decisions add little in 
the way of defining what is required for a successful necessity defense. 
Rather than exclusively criticize or acclaim the annulment decisions, the 
better approach may be to appreciate them for their contributions to the 
process of appropriate legal analysis of Argentina’s necessity defense, 
while also appreciating their limitations in terms of defining the scope of 
what a necessity defense does and does not require. 
 
 186.  Id at 225. 
 187.  Id.  
 188.  Id. at 225–26.  
 189.  Id. at 226. 
 190.  See Bjorklund, supra note 6, at 507 (“Moreover, it is difficult to conclude that abiding by any 
particular economic obligation would in and of itself be sufficient to send the country into collapse. 
Only an aggregate of the circumstances is likely to suffice. This suggests that a State facing individual 
claims brought under investment treaties will have an exceptionally difficult time successfully 
establishing a necessity defense, unless a tribunal adopts an approach similar to that of the LG&E 
tribunal, which viewed the economic crisis as requiring the adoption of an economic recovery package, 
into the details of which the tribunal did not inquire.”)  
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B. Inconsistency 
As noted above, dispute resolution under ICSID is decentralized and 
not designed as a system of stare decisis.191 As a practical matter, tribunals 
under ICSID are constituted on an ad hoc basis, for the sole purpose of 
resolving a specific case.192 It should come as no surprise that both the 
tribunals and corresponding annulment committees in the Argentine Gas 
Cases reached conflicting decisions, despite highly similar fact patterns and 
issues raised. Given the nature of the ICSID dispute resolution system, the 
Argentine Gas Cases are illustrative of inconsistencies in arbitral awards 
under the ICSID regime. Several commentators have addressed the concern 
that inconsistencies in decisions by tribunals and annulment committees 
under ICSID have undermined the system’s legitimacy.193 
Complaints of “vagueness and indeterminacy” of investor rights and 
protections illustrate problems of “predictability in the application of 
investment treaties.”194 Inconsistencies among arbitral decisions thus 
present stability concerns that adversely affect the expectations of both 
states and their foreign investors.195 On the one hand, foreign investors may 
not receive certain expected benefits that were the basis of their investment; 
on the other, states are accountable to taxpayers to explain why they are 
subject to costly damage awards only in certain circumstances.196 Because 
of these concerns, it has been suggested that the ICSID regime must 
“involve reasoned and responsive debate among arbitral tribunals and 
annulment committees if it is to function at all as a system of law, rather 
than a set of arbitrary decisions.”197 
 
 191.  See ICSID Convention, supra note 12, arts. 37–49. 
 192.  Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy 
of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 475 (2009); see also GUS VAN HARTEN, 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 152–53 (2007).  
 193.  See, e.g.,. Brower & Schill, supra note 192, at 473; Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 507–20; 
Khamsi supra note 3, at 385 (describing the concern for consistency in international investment law as 
“reflect[ing] wider fears of the de-legitimizing consequences of the ‘fragmentation’ of public 
international law threatened by the growth of discrete specialties within international law and the 
proliferation of international dispute settlers”); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1521, 1546 (“This alternative gives broad discretion to the state invoking necessity under an 
NPM clause, and is not without consequences of its own.”).  
 194.  Brower & Schill, supra note 192, at 473.  
 195.  Franck, supra note 193, at 1558.  
 196.  Id.  
 197.  Szewczyk, supra note 166, at 551; see also Brower & Schill, supra note 192, at 472–3 (“This 
rise of international investment law and its dispute-settlement mechanisms does not, however, take 
place in a void. It is a consequence of equally unprecedented increases in transborder investment flows, 
a necessary concomitant of the increasing globalization that has taken place since the end of the Cold 
War. It is this change in the world's social and economic environment that has created the need for legal 
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To avoid inconsistency, one alternative is for the states party to the 
ICSID Convention, which are responsible for the development of 
international investment law and the rules for dispute resolution thereunder, 
to undertake serious efforts to clarify the substance what constitutes a valid 
necessity defense.198 In the case of Argentina, further explanation of 
whether and to what extent the requirements of Article 25 of the Draft 
Articles are to be incorporated into an NPM Exception pursuant to Article 
XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT would avoid inconsistencies in the 
application of both treaty-based law and customary international law.199 
Theoretically, a jointly issued interpretive note by the U.S. and Argentina 
on the applicability of Article 25 of the Draft Articles would provide 
insight into the interpretive process to be followed by future arbitral 
tribunals in adjudicating investor-state disputes under the U.S.–Argentina 
BIT. Realistically, however, clarification by either Argentina or the U.S. is 
highly unlikely. Given that Argentina still has many cases pending against 
it, investors would likely view any unilaterally issued clarification or 
interpretive note as self-interested. Moreover, many of the claimants in 
pending cases are U.S. investors, making it highly unlikely that the U.S. 
government would choose to join Argentina in issuing an official 
clarification. 
Another suggestion to avoid legitimacy concerns is the creation of a 
centralized appellate review process for investment arbitration awards. The 
public interest served by international investment law “calls for 
transparency in the proceedings and consistency in the results.”200 
However, the structure of investor-state dispute resolution systems such as 
ICSID are criticized as “‘shadow governments’ dispensing ‘justice behind 
 
institutions that structure and stabilize foreign investment activities and help to regulate conflicts that 
unavoidably arise out of increases in investment cooperation.”).  
 198.  Szewczyk, supra note 166, at 552; see also Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 514 (“The cases to 
date thus reflect differences in approach, but few concrete examples of how those approaches would be 
applied in practice. The lack of clear direction . . . and the potential for a different practice to develop in 
cases decided on the basis of exculpatory treaty provisions mean[s] that it will be up to dispute 
settlement tribunals themselves to establish the appropriate approach.”). 
 199.  Szewczyk, supra note 166, at 552.  
 200.  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, In Search of Transparency and Consistency: ICSID Reform 
Proposal, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGNT., (Nov. 2005) at 1, available at http://www.lk-
k.com/data/document/search-transparency-and-consistency-icsid-reform-proposals-transnational-
dispute-management.pdf (“Transparency is about opening the doors of the hearing room. Consistency is 
about delivering coherent decisions and avoiding contradictory results that undermine the credibility of 
investment arbitration overall and jeopardize the development of investment law.”). For a list of 
advantages and disadvantages of an appeal mechanism, see Katia Yannaca-Small, Improving the System 
of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The OECD Governments’ Perspective, in APPEALS MECHANISM 
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 13 (Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson, eds., 
2008).  
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closed doors’ and even sometimes engaging in ‘arbitral terrorism.’”201 A 
large part of the problem stems from the fact that investor-state arbitration 
is modeled after commercial arbitration, which is largely private, 
confidential, and unconcerned with consistency due to the private nature of 
“one-off” contractual arrangements.202 Where public interest is involved, as 
in international investment, it adds an extra element to the arbitral process 
that is not otherwise present in commercial arbitration. Based on these 
concerns, one solution (at one point contemplated by ICSID)203 is the 
creation of a centralized appellate review process for investment arbitration 
awards. 
While a centralized appellate review process would “ensure overall 
consistency in the development of investment law,” it would be 
meaningless unless nationally and politically neutral.204 As an 
administrative matter, this creates a number of issues: staffing appellate 
panels with nationals of the states party to the dispute would defeat the 
purpose of an independent appellate review process,205 as may staffing 
panels with states that have favorable political or economic ties, or that 
have adverse interests to those states involved in the dispute. Moreover, 
determining the correct number of panelist so as to create a neutral review 
process without sacrificing efficiency also limits the feasibility of a 
centralized review process.206 One of the benefits of the current system is 
its finality, absent an annulment proceeding. However, it appears that 
finality comes at the cost of consistency in a system of ad hoc tribunals 
organized to arbitrate a specific case. 
Yet another suggestion, “rather than remedy the damage after it has 
occurred” by way of appeal, or risk political controversy by way of an 
untimely interpretive note, is to permit a system of preliminary rulings 
during a pending proceeding.207 For example, European Community Law 
“effectively secures the uniform application of European law by domestic 
courts in all Member States through preliminary rulings of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities.”208 Questions are deferred for 
preliminary rulings where a decision on a specific question is essential for 
 
 201.  Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 200, at 1. 
 202.  Id. at 2.  
 203.  Id.  
 204.  Id. at 5.  
 205.  Id.  
 206.  Id. at 6.  
 207.  Christoph Schreuer, Preliminary Rulings in Investment Arbitration, TRANSNAT’L DISP. 
MGMT., (Nov. 2007) , at 3,available at http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/prel_rul_article.pdf.  
 208.  Id.  
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the respective national court to render a judgment.209 Although there is an 
argument that permitting preliminary decisions would clog an otherwise 
heavily loaded system, the matters deemed permitted as preliminary 
questions could be limited to “a fundamental issue of investment treaty 
application”210 such as conflicting decisions on the same facts like in the 
Argentine Gas Cases. 
However, a system of preliminary rulings suffers from many of the 
same administrative complications as establishing a permanent appellate 
review process. Several substantive concerns would need to be resolved, 
including permitted circumstance for requesting a preliminary ruling, 
whether preliminary rulings are obligatory, and whether preliminary rulings 
would be binding or recommendatory in nature.211 Preliminary rulings 
provide an interesting alternative to combat inconsistency while avoiding 
some of the complexities involved in setting up an appeals process or 
issuing an interpretive note. Unfortunately, the feasibility of preliminary 
rulings is indeterminate, since several administrative and substantive issues 
would need to be worked out prior to implementing such a process. 
While short-term decisions may be expected under a decentralized 
system of review, there is a strong argument that “in the long term . . . the 
effectiveness of any system of law requires common understanding of the 
rules.”212 To that end, all that may be necessary is merely: 
 
the passage of time—bringing with it a continuous stream of investment 
jurisprudence, a refinement of state practice and treaty making, and 
growing doctrinal analysis—may help create a better understanding of 
the content and scope of the central principles of investment protection 
and result in the creation of a jurisprudence constant.213 
 
Regardless, focusing on long-term solutions would help avoid short-
term inconsistencies stemming from ad hoc tribunals constituted with the 
limited goal of resolving a single investor’s claim, while also helping to 
stem concerns of arbitral tribunals acting as “shadow governments.” 
 
 209.  Id. at 4.  
 210.  Id. at 4–5.  
 211.  Id. at 5.  
 212.  Szewczyk, supra note 166, at 552; see also Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 3, at 385 (“This 
emphasis on consistent law yields predictable prescriptions for reform, such as proposals for 
generalizable principles of investment law or for greater recourse to common background legal 
principles.”) (citations omitted).  
 213.  Brower & Schill, supra note 192, at 474.  
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C. Public Policy Concerns 
Inconsistency among the tribunals and annulment committees in the 
Argentine Gas Cases raises significant public policy concerns for 
Argentina, and likewise for similarly situated states party to bilateral 
investment treaties containing NPM clauses. On the one hand, any measure 
deemed necessary by Argentina in the wake of its financial crisis can result 
in significant penalties stemming from its obligations under customary 
international law, depending on the manner by which a tribunal chooses to 
apply the test for a necessity defense (i.e. whether or not Article XI of the 
U.S.–Argentina BIT imports the requirements under Article 25 of the Draft 
Articles, and what standard applies for meeting those requirements, among 
others).214 Indeed, practice shows that it is extremely difficult to meet the 
requirements for invoking a necessity defense.215 To that end, “it is possible 
that as a practical matter a necessity defence is unavailable to a State 
because the standards in themselves are so high, and because they must be 
cumulatively satisfied.”216 In an effort to resolve this issue, one suggestion 
is amending the U.S.–Argentina BIT to the effect that Article XI becomes a 
self-judging provision, such that the need for “measures necessary for the 
maintenance of the public order” would be determinable on a good-faith 
basis by the state invoking Article XI, would address the issue of how to 
apply a claim for necessity.217 This alternative gives broad discretion to the 
state invoking necessity under an NPM clause. However, self-judging 
treaty provisions are “infrequent in international economic law” and 
typically not provided for in bilateral investment treaties.218 There is good 
reason for this, since self-judging treaties present two issues, (i) difficulty 
in ensuring that a state exercises objective judgment in determining the 
existence of a crisis situation where there is the benefit of an excuse from 
liability and (ii) the problem of “almost inevitable post-hoc judging” of a 
purported crisis situation.219 Thus self-judging treaties do not necessarily 
resolve consistency problems across arbitral tribunals. Instead, a self-
judging NPM clause presents a risk that allowing Argentina full discretion 
over what is and is not necessary in light of a severe economic crisis 
effectively would effectively eliminate all investor protection mechanisms 
 
 214.  Szewczyk, supra note 166, at 552.  
 215.  Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 520. 
 216.  Id.  
 217.  See generally Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 71, at 386–9 (describing the 
implications of self-judging NPM clauses, such as Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT, for state 
responsibility and liability).  
 218.  Reinisch, supra note 16, at 142–3.  
 219.  Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 503.  
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afforded under the U.S.–Argentina BIT,220 including an independent review 
of decisions unilaterally taken by the Argentine government. An overly 
flexible doctrine of necessity would permit a state to effectively avoid 
obligations under a bilateral investment treaty.221 Such an option obviates 
the object and purpose of international investment law to protect investors’ 
foreign investments. 
The annulment decisions are not helpful in this regard. Both the CMS 
and Sempra annulment committees found that the NPM Exception under 
Article XI of the U.S.–Argentina BIT was distinct from the CIL Defense 
pursuant to Article 25 of the U.S.–Argentina BIT.222 However, neither 
annulment committee specified the standard by which an NPM Exception 
should be judged, and consequently, both failed to define a scope of 
permitted state action in times of crisis. By contrast, the Enron annulment 
committee found that importing the requirements of the CIL Defense into 
the treaty-based NPM Exception was a decision permissible within the 
authority of the tribunal.223 Although this provides a standard by which 
Article XI can be judged, the annulment committee does not further define 
the scope of each of the elements to be determined for a successful 
necessity defense. Like the CMS and Sempra annulment decisions, the 
Enron decision also provides little assistance in terms of policy-making. 
Although the LG&E tribunal found that Argentina had successfully proved 
a necessity defense, an annulment decision regarding the analysis of the 
LG&E tribunal may help clarify the issue in light of the CMS, Enron and 
Sempra annulment decisions. However, LG&E annulment proceedings are 
currently pending.224 Considering the opposing policy concerns discussed 
above, state policy-making in times of crisis is largely unaided, if not 
further muddled, by the differing interpretations of the tribunals and 
annulment committees in the Argentine Gas Cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Reconciling the conflicting tribunals’ and annulment committees’ 
interpretations of Argentina’s necessity defense under both the U.S.–
Argentina BIT and customary international law has proven impossible and 
leaves many serious policy questions unanswered. Further complicating 
matters, two of the three awards finding against Argentina were recently 
 
 220.  Szewczyk, supra note 166, at 552.  
 221.  Bjorklund, supra note 9, at 520.  
 222.  CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 11, ¶ 133; Sempra Annulment Decision, supra note 
11, ¶¶ 208–09.  
 223.  Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 11, ¶ 405.  
 224.  See List of Pending Cases, supra note 11.  
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annulled on the point of Argentina’s necessity defense. The general 
confusion over conflicting interpretations has significant implications for 
the security of foreign investments and the legitimacy of international 
investment law, as well as public policy concerns for states party to 
bilateral investment treaties. In determining what makes for a satisfactory 
necessity defense, it is worth noting that the interrelationship between an 
NPM Exception and a CIL Defense is far from established in international 
law.225 Legal “interpretations of necessity clauses in treaties trigger difficult 
questions of meaning (semantics), and normative relationship 
(ontology).”226 This is especially true in the context of “specialized 
treaties,” including those pertaining to international investment law.227 
Ultimately, the question may be about “risk allocation and 
determining who should bear the burden in situations of unforeseen events 
or economic crises.”228 In making such a determination, it is helpful to 
remember that unlike bilateral investment treaties, the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility were not developed with the specific purpose of 
international investment in mind, nor were they designed to resolve 
investor-state disputes.229 However, in light of ICSID’s goal to promote 
“international cooperation for economic development,”230 it is clear that 
international investment law “requires both a stable and predictable 
substantive legal framework” that prevents host governments from 
engaging in arbitrary, wholly unpredictable, or otherwise opportunistic 
behavior.”231 Future reforms must cohesively address investor protection, 
inconsistency and public policy concerns in a way that reflects the 
specialized development of international investment law, while also 
providing adequate risk protection for both host states and their foreign 
investors. 
 
 225.  DIANE A. DESIERTO, NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY CLAUSES 4 (2012) (“As Judge 
Rosalyn Higgins acknowledged in relation to the International Court of Justice’s disposition of the issue 
in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case: ‘… the question arose as to whether a treaty may lawfully be 
terminated or suspended only through application of the substantive rules governing the law of treaties; 
or whether the State responsibility provisions on non-wrongfulness of conduct (for example, a state of 
necessity) also excuse termination or suspension of a treaty. If these questions received no clear answer 
from the Court in that case, nor do they from the International Law Commission in its Final Articles. 
The matter is still open.’”) (citation omitted).  
 226.  Id.  
 227.  Id.  
 228.  Bjorklund, supra note 11, at 522.  
 229.  Id.  
 230.  ICSID Convention, supra note 12, pmbl.  
 231.  Stephan W. Schill, Private Enforcement of International Investment Law: Why We Need 
Investor Standing in BIT Dispute Settlement, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: 
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 32 (Michael Waibel, et. al., eds., 2010).  
